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FLIGHT TEST RESULTS OF THE STRAPDOWN HEXAD INERTIAL REFERENCE UNIT (SIkU)
VOLUME I: FLIGHT TEST SUMMARY
Ronald J. Hruby and William S. Bjorkman*
Ames Research Center
SUMMARY
a
A flight test program was conducted by NASA Ames Research Center to eval-
uate the performance of the redundant, modularized, fault-tolerant Strapdown
Inertial Reference Unit (SIRU) in an aircraft environment. The results of the
flight test program are described in three volumes. This document, Volume I,
summarizes the findings of the program. Volume II contains a detailed descrip-
tion of the flight test program and its results. Volume III contains appen-
dixes which expand on relevant particulars of the SIRU system and the flight
test program.
The principal flight test objectives included assessment of:
1. SIRU system performance as an unaided inertial navigation system
2. Capability of system redundancy management software to detect sensor
failures
3. Flight performance of the dual computer configuration
The results of 15 separate flights showed that the unaided inertial navi-
gation accuracy during cruise was better than 3 n. mi./hr error growth. During
terminal area maneuvers, these errors were less than 5 n. mi./hr. Such error
growths are tolerable for short-haul operation where flight times are short
and where radio navigation updates are available. Additional analysis,
design, and testing would reduce these error growths further. Updating the
inertial data with recorded Distance Measuring Equipment (DMF.) readings (post-
.	 flight) enabled the theoretically aided system to bound the error within
0.2 n.mi.
It
	
	
The flight test showed that with the existing SIRU design it was possible
to isolate gyro failures equal to or greater than 1.6°/hr. A detection thresh-
old set to detect failures less than 1.6°/hr would result in excessive false
alarms. A gyro failure of 1.6°/hr is considered to be a hard failure from the
standpoint of unaided navigation. From the standpoint of flight control, it
represents a very soft failure.
*Senior Analyst, Analytical Mechanics Associates, Inc., Mountain View,
California.
The fault detection and isolation algorithms are the area in need of most
research for the overall SIRU concepts to become operational in aircraft. The
SIRU dual computer system provided both reliable and correct information.
However, several design improvements which could improve the overall reliabil-
ity and maintainability of a future system are suggested.
INTRODUCTION
Current avionics systems employ numerous sensors. actuators, and display
devices for various flight modes. These systems often overlap in function,
and therefore, a limited degree of control and navigation reliability is pro-
vided by this redundancy. However, redundancy, when implemented, most often
provides reliability by way of hardware duplication. For example, in commer-
cial aircraft application, where inertial navigation system reliability is
considered necessary for operational success, redundancy has been implemented
by triplicate systems. An integrated, redundant, avionic implementation with
self-contained fault identification and adaptation capabilities is clearly
needed for future aircraft operations to eliminate unnecessary backup config-
urations (ref. 1). Advances in sensors and semiconductor technology, coupled
with advances in redundant navigation, guidance, and control computer algo-
rithms, have made possible the Strapdown Inertial Reference Unit (SIRU). The
SIRU is a redundant, modularized, fault-tolerant system originally developed
for space applications by the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory under Contract
NAS9-8242 with NASA Johnson Space Center (refs. 2 and 3). Under Contract
NAS2-7439 with NASA Ames Research Center, the original laboratory mechanization
was modified to provide a flightworthy, redundant navigation system installed
in the NASA Convair 340 (CV-340) aircraft (refs. 4 and S). The SIRU Flight
Test Program was undertaken by NASA Ames Research Center to evaluate SIRU in
an aircraft flight environment. The primary goal of the SIRU Flight Test Pro-
gram was to develop a baseline for the performance of an integrated guidance,
navigation, and flight control system for short-haul aircraft.
The SIRU Flight Test System is a free-inertial (unaided, dead-reckoning)
navigation system consisting of a strapdown hexad inertial sensor array and
dual computers. The sensors consist of six single-degree-of-freedom integrat-
ing gyros and six linear accelerometers. The six sensing axes of the inertial
sensor array lie along the normals to six nonparallel faces of an imaginary
dodecahedron illustrated in figure 1. Each axis contains one integrating rate
gyro module (IRIG 16 MOD B) and une accelerometer module (16PM PIP MOD B).
The SIRU dodecahedron configuration and redundancy management software
permit the navigation system to function when any three gyros and any three
accelerometers are operational. This is contingent upon faulty sensors being
detected and removed. When sensor failures are detected and the faulty sensor
identified (isolated), outputs of the faulty sensors are excluded from the
computation of position, velocity, and attitude by system software. The sys-
tem continues to function with the remaining sensors. The modular features
embodied in the SIRU system include prealigned, normalized, interchangeable
assemblies in which each instrument is integrated with its own torque loop and
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temperature controller. The remaining electronics are located in interchange-
able modules, by axis, in the electronics assembly section. The modular fea-
ture enhancec system maintenance repair and line replacement unit capability.
It should be noted that the gyros used in the SIRU are experimental
precision-floated gyros. These gyros are not strong candidates for strapdown
applications in short-haul aircraft because of high cost, warmup time
required, and calibration requirements. However, much of the functional soft-
ware and many of the redundancy management techniques evaluated in this pro-
gram are generic to strapdown navigation systems in general and provide a
basis for further investigations using other sensor concepts, such as laser or
y	 tuned rotor gyros.
SIRU was exercised in a laboratory environment from July 1970 through
July 1974, prior to the adaptation of the SIRU instrument package for flight
tests. Fifteen flight tests of the SIRU system were made in NASA's CV-340
aircraft between May 20, 1975 and September 24, 1975. The flight test system
had a digital tape recorder for recording flight test data on magnetic tape
and plasma information displays. The installation of SIRU in the CV-340 is
shown in figure 2.
Several navigational references were utilized in the flight test program
to evaluate navigational performance. In addition to the two Nike-Hercules
radars operated by NASA at the Crows Landing NALF test facility, the test pro-
gram utilized (a) multiple station DME data from a digitally tuned DME
receiver, (b) optical waypoint position fixes taken on landmarks with a drift-
meter and recorded by camera, and (c) surveyed position bench-marks with lati-
tude and longitude used as external references. Barometric and radar altitude
were also measured and recorded in flight. The position references were not
used in the free-inertial navigation computations except for initialization
purposes.
This summary document discusses the primary objectives of the flight test
program, describes the flight test program and the aircraft position reference
system, and summarizes the flight test results, including navigation accuracy
performance of the failure detection and isolation algorithms, and hardware
and software limitations.
SIRU FLIGHT TEST OBJECTIVES
The broad goal of the SIRU Flight Test Program was to explore the feasi-
bility of achieving low-cost, highly reliable, short-haul navigation, guidance
and control through application of strapdown inertial systems technology and
redundancy management techniques. This goal was attained by flight testing
the SIRU system in the NASA Ames CV-340 aircraft. This evaluation provided a
performance baseline for future integrated strapdown, redundant-component air-
craft guidance, navigation, and flight control systems. The tests also pro-
vided the basis for projecting navigational performance, fault detection, and
isolation threshold requirements for aircraft flight control and navigation.
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The principal flight test objectives included assessment of:
1. System performance as a skewed-sensor, free-inertial navigational
system, as evidenced by navigational accuracy achieved in the flight tests
2. System capability to detect and isolate sensor failures by way of
redundancy management software
3. The performance of the dual computer configuration and its compati-
bility with the hexad sensor redundancy concept
'	 The last objective included combining the flight results with laboratory
results (refs. 5 and 6). Secondary objectives of the test program included
(a) the determination of DME and Nike-Hercules radar accuracies for calibra-
tion of the aircraft position reference system, (b) development of data reduc-
tion procedures, and (c) an assessment of SIRU's inertially smoothed radio
navigation potential.
FLIGHT TEST PROGRAM DESCRIPTION
The SIRU Flight Test Program began May 20, 1975, and ended on Septem-
ber 24, 1975. Several acceptance flights were made earlier at Hanscom Field,
Massachusetts, near Boston (ref. 5). A total of 15 flights was made, with
3 devoted entirely to assessment of cruise navigation performance.
All flights were made in California's San Joaquin and Salinas Valleys,
shown in figure 3. The landmarks (waypoints) used for visual calibration of
the reference system are depicted in figure 3. In general, triangular courses
were followed with Crows Landing used as the central, calibrated waypoint.
The largest segmented courses included Sacramento, Modesto, Salinas, Moffett
Field, and Oakland as waypoints.
Two types of flight test patterns were flown: enroute (Moffett to Crows
Landing and return), and terminal area (in the vicinity of Crows Landing).
The enroute patterns were similar to the one illustrated in figure 4. This
shows takeoff from Moffett Field, turning to fly over the Moffett DME for a
tape mark, flying over the San Jose DME for another tape mark, flying over
Lick Observatory for a visual mark, overflying the Crows Landing DME for a
final tape mark, and then landing. Portions of each of the flights were
utilized for test calibration and system adjustments. Most flights were made
below 3000-m (10,000-ft) altitude. Cruise flights were of sufficient length
to record one or more complete Schuler periods.
Terminal area maneuver tests followed a flight profile similar to the one
illustrated in figure 5. The flight tests generally combined both enroute and
terminal segments.
A typical flight sequence originating at Crows Landing after a fine
alignment is shown in figure 6. In this flight, the CV-340 left Crows Landing,
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crossed Stockton, Modesto, Castle AFB, Merce.., and finally turned back to
Crows Landing. At each waypoint, a visual calibration was made by using the
driftmeter and marking the time of passing runway reference points. The time
of the waypoint mark was automatically recorded on the magnetic tape for post-
flight correlation with the SIRU and reference system's data.
Position Reference System
The position reference system used during the SIRU flight tests to track
the CV-340 aircraft consisted of three primary references: (a) the NASA radar
tracking system at Crows Landing NALF, California, (b) a multiple DME system
:!mounted within the aircraft, and (c) time-referenced photographs of airport
reference benchmarks taken periodically from the CV-340 throughout each flight.
The radar tracking system consisted of two modified Nike-Hercules radar sys-
tems. The modification provided improved resolution through the use of 19-bit
range and angle digital shaft encoders. No atmospheric refraction correction
was provided. A transponder aboard the CV-340 was used to improve 'angle
tracking.
The multiple DME receiver system provided range information from as many
as six DME stations. The system utilized a fast-switching DME receiver which
was automatically programmed to scan sequentially for each of six selectable
DME frequencies. Range lockup time was 1 sec maximum, and range output reso-
lution was 18.5 m (0.01 n. mi.).
Photographs of reference landmarks were taken from the aircraft by a
camera mounted on a standard military driftmeter installed in the underside of
the aircraft fuselage. The positions of the driftmeter and multiple-DME sys-
tem within the CV-340 are illustrated in figure 2. The time point at which
each photograph was taken was recorded in the SIRU digital tape recorder in
order to correlate with radar and DFX position data. The number of photo-
graphs per flight varied from 8 to 16 depending upon the length of the flight.
The driftmeter's level gyro was Inoperable during most of the flight tests,
thus introducing a small amount of uncertainty in the aircraft position so
determined from the photographs.
The relative accuracies of the different methods of locating the aircraft
position are summarized in table 1. This table lists the rms residuals
obtained from combinations of radar/photograph (driftmeter), DME/photograph,
and radar/DME. The residuals listed in table 1 are much s- , Tler than the SIRU
navigation errors sustained during the flight tests.
TABLE 1.- POSITION REFERENCE SYSTEM RMS RESIDUAL SUMMARY
Average residual, m
Radar photograph	 DME 2hotogra2h	 Radar DME
135.23	 220.19	 218.65
The software for analyzing the SIRU flight test data, using the Ames IBM 360
and CDC 7600 computers, is presented in Volume II of this report.
5
FLIGHT TEST RESULTS
Summary
The flight tests included multiple segments in which each segment pro-
duced a magnetic tape of recorded SIRU test data. In most cases, SIRU was
fine-aligned between segments, so that each such segment could be considered a
separate flight test. Thirty-four segments were flown, producing about 36 hr
of navigation data. Commentary on individual flights is found in Volumes II
and III of this report.
•	 Figure 7 depicts the in-flight duration, navigation wode duration, and
radar coverage for the 15 flight tests; the flight date appears on the left of
the figure. Each flight segment is represented by an unbroken horizontal line.
Later segments are shown relative to the zero time point of the first segment
for each multisegment flight. Navigation duration for any segment is indi-
cated by the length of the segment's unbroken line. The darkened portion of
thf, line indicates time in flight, with "T" denoting takeoff and "L" denoting
lauding. Radar coverage periods are indicated by parenthesized line segments
,just above the navigation segments. Observe that 12 of the 15 flights had
some radar coverage. DME coverage, although of less accuracy than radar
coverage, was present in almost unbroken fashion for every flight test segment.
Table 2 summarizes characteristics of the Ames Research Center flight
tests. Navigation mode and flight duration (in seconds) are listed after a
brief description of the route flown by the CV-340. "Radar intersection" is a
tabulation of the total time interval during which there are data concurrently
on both the SIRU and radar tapes. The column headed "Marks" contains the
number of position fixes taken and recorded; "Computers" identifies which
computers were recorded and whether they differed when both were recorded;
"Rate" denotes whether raw sensor data were recorded at the high rate "H"
(20 Hz) or the low rate "L" (1 Hz).
Maximum position error is shown in nautical miles and, in most cases,
refers to the DME-derived position, which was assumed to be correct. The
maximum error usually occurred at the end of the recorded segment. It should
be noted that some tests were flown without particular concern for naviga-
tional accuracy and that operational mistakes are included with the "errors."
Detected failures are listed in the last two columns of table 2. Fail-
ure, in the :ontext of this report, means that the performance of a given
instrument, gyro or accelerometer, exceeded a predetermined limit that had
been established in the failure detection software. Unscheduled failures are
those which were unintentional, while scheduled failures were caused by inten-
tionally miscompensating the sensors at some point in flight. The notation
"G(FCBDEA)," for example, indicates that every gyro failed at some time during
the test, the order of failure being first F and finally A. The notation A(D)
means that only accelerometer D failed during the segment.
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Navigation Accuracy Results
Navigation accuracy was evaluated by comparing the indicated position
with a position independently derived from one of the external position refer-
ences at the same computer frame time.
Except for occasional bad data intervals, the external position references
were in good agreement during the SIRU test program. Discrepancies from the
references Caere small relative to the system navigational error. In each
instance where the B computer differed from the A computer (by the insertion
of scheduled failures into B and not into A), the navigational error estimate
from the better computer (A) was used in performance calculations.
Table 3 summarizes navigation performance during the flight test program.
The maximum position error (residual) appears after the flight date and navi-
*tion duration columns. This maximum error does not necessarily occur at the
e,ui of the navigation segment because the navigational error does not grow
linearly with time. In an attempt to represent the navigational error as a
staple function of time, the navigation error was "fitted" by the least-
squares method to:
1. a constant (the average, shown in column 4 of the table)
2. a straight line through the origin (slope is shown in column 5j
3. a straight line (error - a + bt, as shown in column 6, b in column 7)
The data in table 3 show generally improved navigational performance with time
into the test program, and wide variations in navigational performance
between segments of particular flights.
On the basis of table 3, system navigational accuracy rating at the end
of the test program was about 3 to 4 n. midh: although flight 9/24 indicated
1.02 n. mi./hr. The wide variations between same-day segments were due to
alignment uncertainties and human error because bias and scale-factor sensor
output correction were common among these segments. The variations were also
caused by the effects of different maneuvers on dynamic sensor compensations.
Failure Detection and Isolation (FDI) Algorithm Performance
The SIRU failure detection algorithm is based upon computing the sum
total of the squared error (TSE) of each inertial sensor type and comparing it
against a dynamically changing threshold called maximum allowed squared error
(MASE). When the TSE exceeds the threshold by a certain ratio, a sensor fault
is indicated. Setting the threshold too low can lead to predictable but false
"failures" during certain aircraft maneuvers. Setting the threshold too high
can lead to undetected but real sensor failures. The selected threshold
values were a function of quantization of sensor output, digital system noise,
and aircraft maneuvers. Details of this algorithm can be found in Volume II
of this report. The failure detection algorithms were executed at each
si
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TABLE 3.- SIRU NAVIGATION PERFORMANCE
Navigation Maximum Average Average Straight line (a+bt)Flight duration, position position slope,date
sec
error, error, n. mi./hr a, b,n.
n. mi. n. mi. n. mi./hr
5/20 5,171 5.93 3.19 4.61 -0.02 4.65
5/30A 2,380 12.82 4.47 9.80 -12.31 34.56
5/30B 5,980 41.02 17.76 20.77 -6.56 26.59
6/16A 3,074 23.08 12.30 29.61 -2.95 34.73
6/16B 2,321 3.55 .81 2.70 -.15 3.06
+	 6/18 15,303 33.99 12.60 5.49 4.39 3.90
6/25 3,405 12.94 7.63 15.58 1.07 13.86
7/14 6,005 35.59 15.65 19.79 -3.77 23.27
7/17A 4,888 4.40 2.52 2.94 .53 2.44
7/17B 4,155 2.10 1.02 1.22 .45 .77
7/24A 2,400 2.79 1.21 3.64 -.01 3.67
7/24B 2,555+ 1.23+ .36 .97 .04 .88
7/24C 2,587+ 4.04+ 1.48 4.35 -.62 5.63
7/29A 4,900 14.06 8.53 10.50 -1.88 12.50
7/29B 2,426 7.13 1.76 6.14 -1.32 9.09
8/22A 2,630 2.93 1.38 3.94 -.24 4.44
8/228 2,110 .36 .31 .84 .27 .14
8/22C 4,082 11.16 2.22 4.81 -.92 6.20
8/22D ? ? ? ? ? ?
8/29A 2,620 7.65 2.10 6.65 -1.48 9.71
8/29Ba 2,501a .3a .15 .36 .12 .11
9/05A 2,200 2.50 1.06 3.56 -.10 3.81
9/05B 3,067 3.72 1.05 2.73 -.53 3.66
9/05C 2,013 1.86 .60 2.25 -.16 2.68
9/05D 2,053 3.00 .73 4.13 -.57 6.22
9/10A 3,733 3.97 1.19 2.36 -.20 2.65
•	 9/10B 6,685 10.19 4.40 5.32 -1.92 6.86
9/10C 9,620 19.36 6.70 5.37 -1.66 6.29
9/10D 12,130 20.14 8.16 5.15 -.85 5.53
9/18A 3,860 6.22 2.22 4.52 -.96 5.85
9/18B 7,345 7.62 4.00 3.85 .34 3.61
9/18C 10,700 6.88 4.33 2.59 2.03 1.57
9/18D 1,600 2.91 .95 4.79 -.54 6.61
9/24 _ 15,819 7.80_ 3.92 1.59 1.68 1.02
$Position reset at 1300 sec.
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inertial data (gyro or accelerow-us er) update point to enable "failed" instru-
ments to be taken off-line without causing excessive perturbation to the com-
puted aircraft attitude or velocity. For the flight test program, the SIRU
update rate was 20 times per second.
Scheduled sensor "failures" were imposed on 11 of the flight test seg-
ments by purposely miscompensating a sensor's null bias. Table 4 suamiarizes
the results of the recorded in-flight scheduled failure tests of the FDI capa-
bility. The level of failure shown is the amount by which the null bias of
the sensor was shifted in the tee'.	 The levels shown in the table are from
Draper Laboratory flight records which were not recorded on the flight tape.
TABLE 4.- SCHEDULED FAILURE DcTECTION/ISOLATION TEST RESULTS
Flight Flight Failed Failure
Time Time	 Undetected Error,
segment
cond,
sensor level
in	 detected duration, dAng, dVa
sec sec sec
7717H SL C gyro 5° hr 807 866 59 0.082
M A gyro 10°/hr 1267 1300 33 .0920
7/24B SL C accel. 2 cm/sec 2 1628 1648 20 .40 m/sec
SL E accel. 3 cm/sec 2 21.02 21211 21 .63 m/sec
7/24C SL C gyro 5°/hr 1392 1443 51 .071°
SL C accel. 2 cm/sec 2 1599 1619 20 .40 m/sec
M,SL A gyro 3°/hr 1808 1925 117 .0970
7/29A M,SL C gyro 3.5°/hr 1308 1394 86 .084°
SL D gyro 30/hr 1433 1568 135 .1120
7/29B M C gyro(A) 0.5°/hr 607 --- --- ---
M C gyro(B) 1.5°/hr 659 902 243 .1010
8/22B SL A gyro 6167°/hr 495 495 -<1 (.086°,	 1.70)
SL B gyro 6161°/hr 516 516 :S1 (.086°,	 1.1°)
M A gyro 6161°/hr 1664 1664 S1 (.0860,	 1.70)
M B gyro 6167°/h• 1682 1682 :<l (.086°,	 1.7°)
8/29B SL,M A gyro b°/hr 675 775 100 .1670
SL B gyro 24°/hr 680 691 11 .0730
9/05A SL E gyro 6°/hr 1205 1254 49 .0820
SL F gyro 240/hr 1211 1222 11 .0730
9/05B M A accel. 1 cm/sec t 765 863 98 .98 m/sec
M B accel. 4 cm/sec t 773 863 90 3.6 m/see
9/05C M E gyro 60/hr 595 645 50 .0830
9/05D M C accel. 1 cm/sec t 488 572 84 .84 m/sec
M D accel. 4 cm/sec t 500 572 72 2.88 m/sec
aSL: straight-and-level flight; M:	 maneuvering flight.
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In table 4, "Time In" is the SIRU navigation time point at which a
recorded keyboard entry indicated that the "failure" was inserted; this
assumes no appreciable lag in changing the compensation. "I'ime Detected" is
the navigation time point at which the failure status flags showed the correct
sensor to have failed. "Undetected Duration" is the time interval during
which the undetected failure was corrupting the attitude and navigation cal-
culations. The notations "AAng" and "4V" are resultant angle and velocity
errors computed by multiplying the level of failure by the undetected dura-
tion. (Note: Approximately one-half of AAng or AV corrupts the attitude
and navigation calculations because of the way hexad measurements are reduced
to triad data in SIRU. Attitude and navigation errors are generally quite
predictable from AAng and AV.)
The gyro error detection threshold was set to 1.14°/hr from considera-
tions of minimizing operational false alarms during flight. The "detection
threshold" is directly related to sensor random errors, uncompensated modeling
errors, and dynamic digital system noise.
The table shows that in every case but one the scheduled failed sensor was
correctly isolated by the FDI algorithms even though unscheduled failures were
present in many instances. In the one unsuccessful case, 0.5°/hr null bias
y	 shift was inserted into the A computer's compensation of the C gyro (x, y
plane) during flight segment 7/29B and went undetected. 7.'he angle error, Ang,
may be seen to be approximately constant in all cases except the computer
failures of flight segment 8/22B. In that test, data reduction of the flight
tape could not pinpoint the detection duration within 1 sec. If the failure
were detected immediately, no angle error would result. If it were detected
in 0.05 sec (SIRU's computation update cycle), the error would be 0.0856°, and
if detection required 1 sec, the error would be 1.7°.
Figure 8 shows both the theoretical experimental failure detection and
isolation of the attitude sensors as a function of failure magnitude. Also
indicated in figure 8 are flight control application requirements of which
inertially smoothed landing guidance requires the shortest failure identifica-
tion and removal time.
As indicated in table 2, there were many unscheduled failures during the
flights. The details of these failures are found in Volume II of this report.
These failures were caused by the following:
1. Improper sensor compensation
• Human error
• Calibration procedure
• Poor error model
2. Thermal conditions
• Blowing cold air
• Ambient temperature in excess of 88° F
3. Other
The above failure sources were largely removed as the flight program
progressed.
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The statistical portion of the FDI algorithm was removed after Flight
7/17B because its operation was correlated with a high level of false alarms.
The FDI algorithm will identify deficiencies in dynamic modeling errors by
indicating a "failure" in the system. In order to reduce such false alarms,
it would be necessary to increase the operating failure threshold to be com-
patible with system dynamics of the flight environment. The maximum values of
the gyro error measured in flight are compared with those found in the
laboratory in the following table.
Flight Laboratory
Tarns
Level flight
2.880/hr
1.0°/hr
0.24°/hr
0.01°/hr
Thus, considerable improvement in the aircraft dynamic modeling is required
before flight failure thresholds can be lowered to those obtained in the
laboratory.
Hardware and Software Limitations
During flight tests in the CV-340 aircraft, certain limitations were
experienced with respect to the SIRU hardware and software. These limitations
are now summarized.
Hardware limitations- The SIRU integrating rate gyro (IRIG 18 Mod B) was
designed for continuous operation in a spacecraft environment. Because of the
operational safety requirement to turn the system off when unattended, gyro
parameter shifts were encountered across cooldown and powerdown; this neces-
sitated frequent calibrations. The quantization level of 44 arc-sec was ade-
quate for long-term space missions with periodic external updates, but not for
the short-term high-dynamic environment of the aircraft. The rate limitation
of 1 rad/sec is no problem in a spacecraft, but does represent a limitation in
an aircraft. A 2-hr warmup requirement prior to a 2-hr calibration is no
problem in the long countdown of a spacecraft but is definitely unacceptable
for an operational aircraft.
The accelerometer (16 PM PIP) and its torque loop were more than adequate
in all respects in the aircraft environment and therefore posed no limitation.
Their calibration was stable over a period of 1 year.
The SIRU sensor pallet mounting fixture was designed to permit calibra-
tion of the SIRU sensors in the aircraft. It provided positioning of the
inertial frame package to four cardinal points: 90° rotations about the sys-
tem Z axis and one 90 0 rotation to put the Z axis in the vertical or horizon-
tal plane. This permitted placing the ±X, ±Y, and t Z axes down individually
for multiple position calibration. The mounting fixture did not allow a
-Z axis down orientation. This missing sixth position would have improved the
calibration accuracy.
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A pair of wedge rings was provided to permit leveling the system prior to
the aided single or multiple position test; however, the aircraft was off
level more than these rings could compensate. It was necessary to jack up the
nose of the aircraft by about 3° to put the sensor level within the compeLisa-
tion range of the wedge rings.
The sensor level was measured ?-y a 10-arc-sec bubble mounted on the SIRU
frame in a recessed well so that it could be rotated 360°. The 10-arc-sec
bubble mounting surface had been precision-machined with respect to the system
reference cube. With repeated operations, its aluminum surface became worn
and the repeatability of the measured accelerometer biases was uncertain.
The SIRU sensor pallet cooling system was limited to an ambient air tem-
perature range of +40 0
 
to +88° F. The inertial component temperature con-
trollers could not control the gyro and accelerometer temperatures outside
this range. Lack of control caused sensor parameter shifts which would be
detected by the FDI software as a transient sensor failure. The aircraft air
conditioning system was inadequate in the early part of the flight test pro-
gram and allowed ambient air temperatures to exceed 90°. It was never adequate
when the aircraft was sitting on the ground and the outside air temperature
exceeded 90°. Operation of the air conditioning required that one engine be
running. This limited the accuracy of the calibration. The ground-support
cooling system used to correct this problem caused overcooling of some inertial
components when the cabin temperature was normal because the outlets of the
aircraft air conditioning were exhausting cold air directly onto these inertial
components, causing uncompensated temperature gradients in the sensors and
thereby triggering a transient failure report from the FDI aigurithm. This
condition was corrected once the source of the problem had been isolated.
Software limitations- Postflight analyses indicated that the base motion
isolation software mechanization did not perform as well as expected and was
the caus-, of excessive errors in estimates of north and level during fine
alignment.
Using computed body velocity at the end of each 1-sec navigation update
to approximate the average velocity over that update period caused
acceleration-induced position errors as large as 52 m for 180° turns. These
errors averaged to zero for straight-line acceleration and deceleration.
The statistical FDI algorithm threshold limits were specified to be
1.5 times the standard deviation of the g)ro error derived from the laboratory
test environment. Flight test experience showed that the gyro errors were
greatly increased as compared to the laboratory dynamic test data. The orig-
inal limits were 0.06°/hr for static conditions and a maximum dynamic increase
of 0.12°/hr to give a maximum threshold of 0.18°/hr. These were changed to
0.48°/hr static and 0.96 ` /hr maximum dynamic increase to give a maximum
threshold of 1.44°/hr. rhese increases were derived more intuitively than
analytically and proved to be inadequate as evidenced by the large number of
"false" failures. The software was then modified to remove the statistical
FDI in the navigation mode and therefore in the flight mode (after flight 717).
The FDI algorithm was then totally dependent upon the TSE which had thresholds
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of 1.14°/hr MASE and 1.48°/hr maximum dynamic increase to give a maximum
threshold of 2.62 0 /hr. Later analysis showed that the statistical limits
should have been 0.75°/hr static with a maximum dynamic increase of 1.65°/hr
to give a maximum threshold of 2.50°/hr for utilization of the statistical FDI
during aircraft-navigation.
The TSE failure detection thresholds were initially determined on the
basis of laboratory tests without compensation for aircraft dynamics. How-
ever, the TSE threshold is environmentally sensitive. The initial gyro
threshold was 0.76°/hr with a maximum dynamic increase of 0.81°/hr, resulting
in a maximum threshold of 1.57°/hr. Early flight test data indicated false
gyro "failures" were being triggered during aircraft turn maneuvers because
these limits were low. The limits were raised to 1.14°/hr for the threshold
and 1.98°/hr for the maximum dynamic increase, giving a maximum threshold of
3.12 0 /hr. Also, the accelerometers, initially set at 0.4 cm/sec t for the
first-fail threshold and 0.13 cm/sec t for the second-fail threshold were reset
to 0.28 and 0.25 cm/sec t , respectively. These changes removed the false
failure indications during aircraft maneuvers.
CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions have been drawn from the program test results
relative to each of the three principal objectives presented previously.
Navigation System Performance
For short-haul aircraft operations, free-inertial navigation accuracy of
1 to 3 n. mi./hr is generally acceptable. Test results showed that this
performance level was achieved during cruise conditions. Navigation perfor-
mance during terminal area maneuvers (including degradation in the presence of
scheduled and unscheduled failures) produced higher error buildup. However,
even without preflight calibration, these error rates did not exceed
5 n. mi./hr. In summary, it was demonstrated that a system like SIRU can
provide the inertial navigation capability necessary for short-haul applica-
tions. However, additional analysis, software design, and testing are
'	 required to minimize dynamic errors resulting from uncompensated instrument
misalignments and scale factor errors.
The SIRU Navigation Analysis Program was modified to allow computation
of navigation states by inertially smoothing DME radio data. An analysis of
SIRU's potential for providing inertially smoothed radio navigation (i.e.,
aided-inertial navigation) indicated that a DME/baroaltitaeter/inertial system
bap sd on SIRU could easily maintain a navigation accuracy of a few hundred
m ters. For one flight, the maximum aided-inertial root-sum-square position
Error was about 0.2 n. mi. compared to a free-inertial maximum error of
3.7 n. mi. on the same flight.
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As an auxiliary effort, some sensor data from the flight test program
were analyzed to assess SIRU use for integrated short-haul flight control
applications. The SIRU gyro resolution was 44 arc-sec (0.0002 rad) per bit.
Data analyses showed that the quantization-derived digital noise from the
44-arc-sec/bit resolution would prohibit use of such data in short-haul flight
control systems. Also, the system's full-scale gyro measurement capacity of
1 rad/sec is too low for many flight control applications. Scale changing to
achieve higher full scale without increasing the word length would increase
the quantization error. Current flight control technology can produce
1.6 arc-sec quantization at 2 rad/sec full-scale output. Thus, substantial
modification to both hardware and software of SIRU would be required to allow
flight control use.
Failure Detection and Isolation Algorithm Performance
The analysis of the flight data was directed towards comparing the experi-
mentally measured failure isolation time with the theoretical isolation time.
This comparison is related to the digital system noise derived from motion
dynamics. Its assessment provides technical insight for assessing other
redundancy management strategies for short-haul avionics.
The torque rebalance loops used in SIRU (dictated by Apollo technology)
were tailored to 44 arc-sec angular resolution for the original spacecraft
application. This size was too large for aircraft operations. Included in
figure 8 is a theoretical 1.6-arc-sec resolution (available in current inertial
navigation system technology) plot of attitude failure rate versus failure
identification and removal time. Such resolution would provide considerably
better results.
A redundant strapoown system should be able to isolate a navigation error
of 28 n. mi. in 4 hr (trans-Atlantic criterion) which corresponds to approxi-
mately a constant 0.1°/hr attitude failure rate. The SIRU flight experiments
showed that achieving a 0.1°/hr failure detection and isolation is more diffi-
cult than originally projected for aircraft operations. It was not possible
to isolate sensor failures smaller than 1.6°/hr because the detection threshold
had to be adjusted to a higher value to avoid false alarms. This threshold was
approximately a factor of 30 larger than the laboratory sensor drift measure-
ment. This experimentally measured threshold indicated that the SIRU system
can detect and isolate only hard failures for inertial navigation but may pro-
.	 vide reliable operation for flight control purposes.
In reviewing these results, it must be remembered that the SIRU concept
was originally designed as a redundant strapdown replacement for the Apollo
spacecraft gimballed inertial measurement unit. The resulting operational,
electrical, mechanical, environmental, and mission interface requirements were
distinctly different from those which existed in the CV-340 aircraft.
The flight test results have shown the limitations of the existing SIRU
hardware and software design for short-haul transportation application. The
results point out areas where additional design and verification efforts are
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required before a redundant strapdown system can be considered for opera-
tional usage. The fault detection and isolation capability is the area in
need of the most work if the SIRU concepts are to become applicable for short-
haul aircraft.
Dual Computer System Reliability
The design of the SIRU dual computer system is basically a good one from
the standpoints of both correctness and reliability. Its strong points are
the intermodule isolation, the intercomputer communication protocol, the wide
variety of error detectors, and the effectiveness of the arbiter function.
The SIRU computer arrangement also has several weak points which do not affect
the normal operation of the system, but do suggest design improvements which
could improve the overall reliability and maintainability of future systems.
These include the self-tests as applied to failure recovery, the computer
software structures, the preflight test facilities, the use of different com-
ponents, and an extension of the arbiter function (refs. 7 and 3). 'Elabora-
tion on each of these points is presented in Volume II of this report.
The principal difficulty with the SIRU dual computer system is the
inability to correct for transient faults which "reprogram" the computer mem-
ory (i.e., an intermittant connection in a "sense" or "write" amplifier) or
the occurrence of multiple faults. When the transient fault is inactive after
modifying memory, the computer self-diagnostic routines will incorrectly
recertify it, but the arbiter will show computer disagreement and no method of
identifying the correctly programmed computer.
The SIRU preflight test system was designed in such a way that the parity
checker, the bit-correct, and the clock-active error detectors could not be
adequately tested. Details for necessary preflight testing and how system
improvements could be made are also discussed in Volume II of this report.
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